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INTRODUCTION
South Asia is a volatile region. In particular, India and Pakistan (Figure 1 ) have, since the end of the Cold War, been widely regarded as the two countries most likely to become involved in a nuclear war. The cultural, religious, and ideological tensions that underlie the state-tostate antagonism are very deep-seated. The long and contested border, frequent armed conflict and mutual distrust result in an inherently unstable situation between the two nuclear armed rivals. This study will summarize the nuclear history of India and Pakistan, illustrate the dangers of instability, and examine potential U.S. actions to enhance stability in this contentious region of significant security interest.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
For a thousand years, the Indus River valley has marked the border between the Hindu to India, and Muslims from India to Pakistan. As many as one million of these people were killed as communal hatred erupted. 4 Since then, India and Pakistan have fought major wars in 1947-48, 1965, and 1971. Not long after the last major war, 18 May 1974, India detonated a nuclear device at Pokhran, Rajasthan, in western India. The fission device had a 10 kiloton (kt) yield. It was as tentative a step as could be taken if one was going to cross the nuclear threshold. India stated that the test was a "peaceful" explosion, and that it had no intention of producing nuclear "In the Nuclear age a bluff taken seriously is useful; a serious threat taken as a bluff may prove disastrous."
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Thus India faces two major credibility problems with its claim to possess fusion or hybrid boosted-fission weapons. First, the claimed yield is not accepted internationally. And second, even if the yields are believed, a large fission weapon rather than a fusion or boosted fission device is the more likely source. A secondary effect of the controversy is that it calls into question the reliability of India's weapon designs. 15 This credibility problem exerts pressure on Indian leaders, in addition to the already strong pressure from the nuclear R&D bureaucracy, to conduct further tests.
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As soon as the news of India's tests broke, the West, with the U.S. in the lead, swung into high gear diplomatically with respect to Pakistan. There was a frenetic effort to dissuade
Pakistan from following India down the nuclear road. Both penalties and incentives were advanced, but to no avail. 17 It was as if the firing circuit at the Indian site of Pokhran continued to the Pakistani site of Chagai, albeit with a fifteen-day delay.
On 28 May 1998, just over two weeks after India's tests, Pakistan claimed to have detonated 5 devices with a total yield of up to 45 kilotons. Two days later they claimed to have detonated a sixth device, thus "one-upping" India's total of five. 18 Just as was the case with India, western scientists disputed the claimed yields, and estimated a total yield of about 10 kt for the first day. 19 Pakistan was obviously engaging in a "tit-for-tat" effort with India. As the former Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, stated in 1965, Pakistan's position was (and remains):
If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves; even go hungry, but we will get one of our own.
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The international community's non-proliferation efforts with respect to India and Pakistan have focused mainly on treaties and control regimes, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), technology controls, and coercive sanctions. Whenever nuclear development gained momentum in either India or Pakistan, the U.S. conducted intense efforts to halt or turn back the nuclear clock. However, at times when the U.S. needed Pakistani help, such as to counter the USSR in Afghanistan, development was allowed to proceed largely unhindered. 21 The U.S. Congress also intervened, passing laws requiring sanctions against proliferators. These laws can limit U.S. freedom of action on the political front at critical junctures.
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At the most basic level, all these international non-proliferation efforts failed because both India and Pakistan are now declared nuclear weapons states. However, this should not be interpreted to mean that non-proliferation efforts were wasted. The fear of international sanctions and censure greatly retarded nuclear developments in both countries and have to date precluded further testing. After the 1974 Indian test, there was a gap of 24 years before India tested again, and for roughly half that time, Pakistan probably had a nuclear capacity too, but did not test. So why, in the end, did both countries "go nuclear"? A combination of security concerns, domestic politics and bureaucratic influence developed enough force to push past the resistance to nuclear development. Once India tested, the domestic pressure within Pakistan to follow suit was irresistible. 23 The lesson is that while non-proliferation efforts may not stop a determined state, they can have a significant effect. It is quite possible that more focused and consistent efforts on the part of the U.S. could have prevented the overt nuclearization of South Asia indefinitely.
THE KARGIL CONFLICT
In 1999, less than one year after declaring its nuclear power status, Pakistan launched an operation on the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC), in Kashmir, near the town of Kargil (Figure 2 ). The LoC, the de facto border between the Pakistani and Indian controlled sections of Kashmir, was delineated by mutual agreement in 1972. Since then, with the exception of artillery and small arms exchanges and smuggling/insurgent infiltration, the LoC has generally been respected. It should be noted that the LoC stops short of the Chinese border, and demarcation between the sides in that remote and inhospitable region is debated. In particular, since 1984 both sides have fought for possession of the Siachen Glacier. This highest battlefield in the world (~18,000 ft) is expensive in terms of men and resources for both countries to maintain. 24 The international significance of the Kargil conflict is that it was "the first major conventional armed conflict to be fought in the nuclear age between two nuclear-weaponcapable states." Pakistan's refusal to admit the obvious cost it dearly in terms of international opinion. 27 By July
Pakistan was beleaguered internationally, and the United States had sided squarely with Indiaa development that appeared to stun Indian leadership. 28 Ultimately, Pakistani President Sharif had little choice but to withdraw his forces. By the end of July, India had reclaimed the lost territory, though at substantial cost to both sides.
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During the Kargil conflict, both sides issued inflammatory statements relating to the possible use of nuclear weapons. These statements were in the long-standing tradition of South-Asian politics, where provocative hyperbole is often voiced, as much for domestic consumption as international. Immediately after becoming nuclear powers, India and Pakistan expressed great confidence in their ability to control any escalation. To western governments however, the Indian and Pakistani confidences were naïve. Coupled with the bellicose public statements, the rhetoric was alarming and damaged the responsible nuclear power image that India and Pakistan were fostering. 30 To their credit, both India and Pakistan appeared to set tight limits on the military once the fighting started, apparently to prevent escalation. India's military restraint and diplomacy in particular earned respect internationally and to some degree offset the damage done by the saber rattling. … there is no reason to quibble with the obvious fact that the Kargil operation, viewed from almost any angle, was ill timed…Given the frequency of international, especially American, warnings in the post-tests period about the nuclear dangers inherent in the volatile Kashmir dispute, the time was clearly unripe for premeditated exhibition of one's heedlessness in the face of those dangers.
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Following the failure in Kargil, Pakistan President Nawaz Sharif and General Pervez
Musharraf, the Chief of Army Staff, battled politically over responsibility for the failure. In
October 1999 Musharraf deposed Sharif as head of state, effectively removing any remaining civilian input from Pakistani strategic decision-making. 36 The Kargil conflict thus vividly illustrates the instability that permeates the India-Pakistan rivalry and the need for U.S. action to lessen the danger.
TO THE PRESENT
Shortly after the 1998 tests, a select Indian committee published a draft nuclear doctrine for India. The main points included: no first use (with some exceptions), a secure second-strike capability, a triad of delivery systems, and a defined chain of command. Overall, the report reads like a roadmap to a mature, robust, Cold War era nuclear system, similar in scope but smaller in scale than those of the United States or Russia.
37 India indeed appears to be following the draft's plan. In the spring of 2002, four years after becoming a declared nuclear power, India began publicly establishing a formal nuclear command and control (C 2 ) system.
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The chain of command runs from the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) through the Chairman, Pakistan is historically very sensitive to perceived closing windows of opportunity.
Between 1947 and 1971, Pakistan repeatedly took risks when a closing window of opportunity was sensed. 45 This tendency has continued at least to the 1999 Kargil conflict, where a closing window of opportunity appeared to contribute to the decision to proceed with the operation.
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Pakistan could be presented with another closing window by moving towards dependence on ballistic missiles as the sole reliable method of nuclear weapon delivery. 47 Pakistan is presumed to plan on a first strike due to its conventional inferiority and to its lack of strategic depth. 48 The reliability of Pakistan's first strike, let alone its second strike capability, is thus crucial to its feeling of security vis-à-vis India. 49 The development of a comprehensive Indian ABM system could shatter Pakistan's feeling of security. Indian leaders already publicly express confidence that India could survive any attack that Pakistan could deliver in a nuclear war. 50 While no ballistic missile defense is 100% effective, a sophisticated ABM system could greatly reduce penetrations by a modest force to a very small number. At the very least, an Indian ABM system might spur a "race" or counter on the Pakistani side, within the limits of their economy.
Concurrent with pursuing ABM's, India is also taking steps to close off other delivery options. India is purchasing advanced radars and new air-to-air fighters, thus keeping in check
Pakistan's ability to use either aircraft or, to a lesser extent, cruise missiles as an alternative to ballistic missiles. 51 Some Pakistanis have gone so far as to state that they would use a bullock cart, if necessary, for nuclear weapon delivery. 52 The coupling of Pakistan's historical sensitivity to closing windows of opportunity, with the perception of a decline in effectiveness of the Pakistani nuclear force, could result in a dangerous situation.
A major argument advanced by both India and Pakistan in favor of their being responsible nuclear powers is the behavior of the established nuclear powers. In the more than half-century since 1945, nuclear weapons have not been used. Hence the argument: just as the U.S. and USSR behaved responsibly, so will India and Pakistan. However as Peter Beckman states:
"…the historical record reveals that young nuclear nations are more likely to consider using such weapons. As states join the nuclear club, they will need to pass through a period of maturation in which there will be such temptation. 1998 marked only the beginning of India and Pakistan's nuclear youth." 53 As more information comes to light about the first few decades of nuclear history, it has become evident that the nuclear peace of the Cold War was not nearly so robust as had been generally supposed, and that luck appears to have been too important a factor in the "long peace" to put much reliance on the Cold War as a model for peace between nuclear rivals.
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Assuming that deterrence is not automatic, what action can the U.S. take to increase nuclear stability?
US GOALS AND OPTIONS
The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States is the capstone statement of policy of the U.S. with respect to security, and puts forth fundamental U. The NSS clearly treats India as an emerging regional and perhaps international force.
The dominant themes with regard to US-India relations are recognition of shared interests and the desire to strengthen the relationship. Pakistan is given less emphasis. 56 This is not to say that Pakistan should be discounted. It is in the U.S. and even Indian interest to ensure that Pakistan remains viable and does not become a failed state. Pakistan is a key to stability, regionally and beyond. While many analysts and U.S. government officials go to great lengths to show equal deference to India and Pakistan, there can be no hiding the fact that India is the dominant power in the region with more international influence and standing. Furthermore, this disparity between India and Pakistan will only grow in the foreseeable future.
Recognition of the power disparity between India and Pakistan is integral to any realistic strategy for the region. Beyond a realistic geopolitical view, the U.S. must be more consistently engaged at the highest levels. It is widely lamented by government officials and academics in the US, India and Pakistan, that the U.S. has lacked consistency in its dealings in the region since the end of WWII. 57 The volatile actions of India and Pakistan do not need an accompanying inconsistency and vacillation in U.S. policy and commitment.
Hand-in-hand with consistency is subtlety. The U.S. has demonstrated an increasingly sophisticated understanding of the region starting with the 1999 Kargil war, but the Global War
On Terrorism appears to have temporarily retarded progress in this area. After September 11 th , the U.S. came back into the region in a big way, with little subtlety or consideration of its impact on the local players. India and Pakistan are proud countries and neither the public nor political leaders take well to a traditionally blunt American approach. Throughout the Cold War, the U.S.
tended to view South Asia as merely part of the US-USSR chessboard. This resulted in an inability to see, or a lack of interest in, second and third order effects of its policies. An example would be arms sales to Pakistan intended to counter the Soviet Union, which India saw as a direct threat. 58 India still has a lingering distrust of American motives based on the experiences of the Cold War, coupled with a strong anti-colonial streak that has evolved into an antiWestern/U.S. sentiment. 59 Thus, the U.S. should carefully avoid the appearance of running the show. For its part Pakistan also has bad memories of dealing with the United States, and perceives a pro-India tilt in recent U.S. actions. 60 On the other hand, Pakistan seeks outside help in resolving the issue of Kashmir, a desire that stems from the realization that alone, it is unlikely to change the status quo.
Thus, a consistent nuanced approach is foundational for any U.S. action in South Asia, but what course should the U.S. take? To synthesize the NSS, the two uppermost aims of the U.S. with respect to India and Pakistan are defeating terrorism and ensuring nuclear peace and stability. Within the overall heading of nuclear stability, there are several key issues for the U.S.
which will be examined here: ABM's, Confidence Building Measures (CBM's), nuclear control and security, non-proliferation, and arms limitations. These issues are all interrelated, but will be treated sequentially. Defeating terrorism also ties in with nuclear stability in a major way, but will only be addressed tangentially in this analysis.
Underlying everything relating to South Asia is the problem of Kashmir. The significant risk of Kashmir becoming the ignition source for a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan has already been demonstrated. Besides the physical danger, the issue of Kashmir has been a significant anchor for both countries. In India's case it has retarded the drive towards internationally recognized great power status. 61 For Pakistan the drain has been more dramatic, leaving it economically and politically weak. 62 The United States has stated clearly that it will not mediate the Kashmir issue: "the decision-makers are India and Pakistan, so there will not be a third chair at the 
THE SALE OF ABM'S TO INDIA
The most immediate decision that the United States faces concerns the sale of ABM's to India. Analysts who otherwise agree on most South Asia issues are divided over the wisdom of selling ABM's to India. 66 Given two roughly equally matched nuclear states, an effective and comprehensive ABM system that puts in question one side's ability to inflict unacceptable damage on the other is potentially destabilizing. Limited non-comprehensive ABM's, such as the system under consideration, can be stabilizing -by protecting a second-strike capability or other limited high-value areas, and defeating small scale or rogue actor attacks. 67 However, when applied against relatively small arsenals, such as Pakistan's, even limited coverage ABM's could be fairly comprehensive in their protection. Thus the impact on stability of an Indian ABM is unclear.
The U.S. has several courses of action available with respect to the sale of ABM's. It can approve or disapprove the sale in isolation, or it can approve the sale and take additional actions to increase stability. One should note that Russia is "waiting in the wings" with its own ABM systems that require no U.S. approval. 68 In addition, any course of action concerns not only the U.S., Israel and India, but also Pakistan, the only Muslim nuclear power, and even China.
The international criticism that the U.S. has faced since withdrawing from the ABM treaty is also significant. Assuming that there is no nuclear war with Pakistan, allowing India to proceed bolsters the U.S. case that self-defense is paramount and not destabilizing. Approval would also enhance cooperation and understanding between the U.S. and India and complete the turn-around since India since first supported, then adopted a muted stance on the U.S.
withdrawal from the ABM treaty. 69 On a moral level, the U.S. has already declared that it is pursuing an ABM shield, thus making it very difficult to deny publicly the same to other countries, especially the world's largest democracy. However with the U.S. and India pursuing ABM's, China could decide to do the same or increase the pace of improvement of its offensive
arsenal. This in turn could cause a cascade of force increases throughout Asia. Denying the sale of ABM's to India would damage the U.S. internationally by strongly reinforcing the existing perception of a unilateralist U.S. applying a double standard even in terms of defensive weapons. Additionally, ABM's are a boom market in international arms sales. By trying to block this sale the U.S. would be "swimming upstream" against a very strong current for relatively little gain. Finally, the line between anti-aircraft systems, which are seen as a normal part of a country's arsenal, and ABM systems, which had been a gray area outside the "normal" range of weaponry, is blurring to the point of invisibility. For these reasons, the U.S. should approve the ABM sales. However, to the uncertain impact of ABM's on deterrence, it would be prudent for the U.S. to take additional measures to increase stability.
Along with approving the sale of ABM's, the U.S. could sell or give Pakistan stabilizing weapons or support systems such as ABM's of their own, C 2 systems, or hardening technology.
Allowing Pakistan the advanced technology that it badly wants would demonstrate evenhandedness and reassure a very nervous Pakistan of long-term U.S. interest in its wellbeing. Alternatively, the U.S. could aid both sides. Since their formation, both India and Pakistan have repeatedly misjudged, or lacked good intelligence on, the intentions or actions of the other side. During the Kargil conflict it even appears that the President of Pakistan was not aware of the increased readiness state of his nuclear forces. 70 Information sharing by the U.S.
could significantly reduce fog and friction, but carries some security risk for the U.S.
The conclusion is that the U.S. should approve the sale of an ABM system to India, but should also take steps to increase stability, particularly through aid to Pakistan and perhaps intelligence sharing with both countries. Tying back into the war on terrorism however, aid to Pakistan should be contingent on non-proliferation and elimination of support for terrorist organizations.
CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES
The building of trust is fundamental to any course of action in the region. There has been little formal communication between the two countries since 1999. As the Council on Foreign
Relations reports: "… especially in the absence of India-Pakistan nuclear discussions and CBMs, the threat of any major conflict going nuclear remains real. For these reasons, the surety and security of both nuclear arsenals is a major issue of vital interest to all, and it is an area where the U.S. can make a direct contribution. The U.S.
has a wealth of experience and knowledge on the safety and control of nuclear weapons such as permissive action links, fail-safes, and command and control procedures. Sharing this knowledge would benefit all parties since each side would have increased confidence in, and less ambiguity about, the other side's arsenal, thereby decreasing the chances of miscalculation.
NON-PROLIFERATION
To date, India has shown no tendency to proliferate its technology. Pakistan, however, appears to present a problem. Persistent reports suggest that Pakistan has exported at least some key technology and expertise and perhaps complete weapons to Korea, Iran and others. 80 In early 2004, facing increasing evidence of proliferation, Pakistan admitted that government scientists were responsible, but denied any official government complicity. 81 Non-proliferation is a key area where the United States needs to take a firm stand. The
Council on Foreign Relations recommends closely linking any aid beyond a base level to Pakistan's performance on key issues, with non-proliferation being the highest priority. 82 The U.S. should support revising international nonproliferation agreements in a way that engages countries like India and Pakistan. The current NonProliferation Treaty and U.S. law penalize "new" nuclear countries in an effort to turn the clock back -there are no structures that would accept irreversibly nuclear countries and motivate them to "close the door behind them. India and Pakistan should be encouraged to remain on this comfortable plateau rather than risk the climb to a higher level of development. By proving their ability to construct nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan achieved their basic goal to become acknowledged nuclear powers. Given the lack of testing subsequent to the 1998 tests, pronouncements by both sides that they will not resume testing, and the high diplomatic and economic costs of resuming testing, India and Pakistan are on a plateau of development -a quasi-stable equilibrium. This is an under-appreciated aspect of South Asian stability, and an area where the U.S., leading the international community, can exert substantial leverage. A relatively modest set of inducements could keep both countries on the plateau of simple fission weapons arsenals.
CONCLUSION
The distrust and divisions between India and Pakistan are very deep-seated, but not insurmountable. The danger of nuclear conflict between the South Asian rivals demands a subtle, nuanced approach from the U.S. that appreciates the interconnectedness of the major issues. In its approach to India and Pakistan, the single most important quality for effective U.S.
action is consistency. Both countries are very sensitive to oscillations in U.S. policy. The U.S.
should manage the introduction of ABM's to the region in such a way that is not destabilizing. (Santa Monica, California, RAND, 2001) , 218-224. The flaws in the Pakistani planning conform well to a small-group decision-making coupled with a strong mix of groupthink blinding the decision makers to reality. In other words, a small group of like-minded decision makers probably planned the operation, with no outsider points of view, and with no objective gaming of the courses of action. See Glenn P. Hastedt, American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future (Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 2000) , 245-248, for more on political decision-making. 34 Ganguly, 121-123. 35 Wirsing, 39. 36 Jones, 55. 37 National Security Advisory Board, Draft Report of the National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine; available from <http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/ nuclear_doctrine_aug_17_1999.html >; Internet; accessed 23 November 2003.
